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This paper examines how the individual and country-level factors affect 
the childcare financing attitudes, particularly the effect of socialization in a 
particular welfare regime. This area of research is fraught with methodologi-
cal and conceptual issues, including the over-reliance on Esping-Andersen’s 
regime typology. Therefore, the authors also investigate whether a more fa-
mily-policy-nuanced categorization of welfare regimes better accounts for the 
cross-country variations in childcare attitudes. Using the 2012 ISSP data, 
the authors conducted the multilevel analysis of 24 European countries, and 
while the effect of most predictors is generally consistent with the previous 
research, this study’s most important finding is that the alternative Leitner’s 
“Varieties of Familialism” typology better accounts for the cross-national va-
riations in childcare attitudes than the classical Esping-Anderson’s typology. 
This speaks of the importance of a programmatic approach in the welfare 
state attitudes analysis which links the public support for specific social pro-
grams to its unique characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION
Welfare state attitudes, i.e. normative 
orientations towards public policies and 
distribution of resources (Svallfors, 2012a) 
differ among the citizens and various co-
untries. Both citizens and various nations 
hold different understandings and beliefs 
about social problems and most particu-
larly about individuals’, state and other 
institutions’ responsibilities in taking care 
of social issues (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 
2003). As welfare state attitudes become 
deeply embedded in people’s preferences 
and expectations (Brooks & Manza, 2007) 
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and thus hard to change, they may provide 
legitimacy for the institutional persistence 
that obstructs policy changes (Svallfors, 
2012a). Citizens’ attitudes may also shape 
voting decisions, so it is relevant to explo-
re and understand them from a policy per-
spective (Goerres & Tepe, 2012).
Research interest for this area is 
growing, and many studies examine the 
determinants of the welfare state attitudes 
(Svallfors, 2012a) and a cross-country va-
riation in these attitudes (Andreß & Heien, 
2001; Jæger, 2006a; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; 
Guo & Gilbert, 2014). While the earliest 
studies looked only at individual-level cha-
racteristics as predictors of differences in 
the welfare state attitudes, recent studies 
brought into focus the country-level deter-
minants. Such studies examined country’s 
cultural, institutional and structural charac-
teristics or the interaction of aggregate-le-
vel and individual-level factors in order to 
explain cross-country variation in welfare 
state attitudes (Andreß & Heien, 2001). Se-
veral studies have also focused on testing 
the regime thesis and examined a possible 
link between the welfare regimes and the 
welfare state attitudes (e.g. Jakobsen, 2011; 
Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Vučković Juroš 
2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014).
Results of such studies are mixed, 
which is not surprising considering that 
they relied on different datasets, covered 
various countries and dimensions of wel-
fare state attitudes and were grounded on 
different theoretical assumptions. Still, 
Svallfors (2012a) claims that an important 
common finding suggests that universal so-
cial policy programs (e.g. pensions, health 
care) enjoy stronger support compared to 
targeted programs (e.g. social assistance, 
unemployment benefits). The welfare state 
attitudes are thus multidimensional and ci-
tizens may hold different beliefs about state 
responsibility and redistribution depending 
on the social policy area (Pettersen, 2001; 
Busemeyer et al., 2009; Svallfors, 2011; 
Guo & Gilbert, 2014). 
These findings question the comparati-
ve studies of the determinants of the wel-
fare state attitudes which relied on public 
support for redistribution or aggregate in-
dices as dependent variables (Jæger, 2006a; 
Busemeyer et al., 2009; Jordan, 2013). 
First, the studies predicting public support 
for redistribution often measure only one 
aspect of the welfare state attitudes, a 
support towards targeted programs which 
aim at redistribution from the rich to the 
poor. However, many social policy areas 
(family policy included) cannot be viewed 
solely through the “redistribution lens”. 
Second, the studies using aggregate indi-
ces as dependent variables are comprised 
from heterogeneous survey questions dea-
ling with attitudes towards various policies 
(e.g. education, employment, pensions) or 
welfare state functions. As these policies 
cover a wide range of activities with dis-
tinct characteristics and functions, aimed at 
support for very different groups, it is not 
surprising that such studies do not find a 
consistent impact of different determinants 
on the welfare state attitudes.   
It is, therefore, necessary to explore in 
more detail the citizens’ attitudes towards 
specific social policy programs. As Jordan 
(2013) argues, a programmatic approach 
allows linking public support for specific 
social programs to its unique structural 
characteristics and investigating support 
for those programs that may not perfectly 
fit into the broader welfare regime type of a 
particular country. This is particularly true 
for policies aimed to address (new) soci-
al risks (e.g. Bonoli, 2005, 2007), such as 
the work-family policies which put special 
focus on childcare, questioning traditional 
modes of family solidarity and division of 
responsibility for care between the family, 
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state, market and other actors (e.g. Sarace-
no, 2011; Morgan, 2012; Blum et al., 2014). 
Still, little is known about public attitudes 
towards childcare policies. Only recently 
there were a few attempts to explore atti-
tudes towards the childcare (e.g. Goerres & 
Tepe, 2010, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014). 
However, these studies predominantly 
covered western European countries and 
focused only on the attitudes about the 
government’s role, rather than the choice 
between various actors (e.g. family, em-
ployers) that may be construed as respon-
sible for childcare provisions. Also, when 
testing a regime thesis, these studies relied 
solely on “classical” regime typology de-
veloped by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), 
which does not capture the differences in 
the design of family policies well. 
This paper thus aims to provide an addi-
tional insight into public attitudes towards 
childcare, one of the core policy areas of 
the social investment agenda. This topic 
currently dominates public discourse in 
the social policy area at European level 
with the request for the increased state in-
tervention (e.g. Morgan, 2012; Europska 
komisija, 2013). However,  even though 
some countries with a long tradition of fa-
milialistic family policies opted for policy 
reforms that increased state responsibility 
in childcare (e.g. Austria, Germany, see 
Seeleib- Kaiser, 2010; Blum et al., 2014), 
that is not a widespread practice within Eu-
rope (e.g. the Czech Republic, see Blum et 
al., 2014). As citizens’ attitudes towards the 
government’s role in social area may influ-
ence reforms by providing legitimacy for 
the institutional persistence or policy chan-
ge (Goerres & Tepe, 2012), it is of particu-
lar interest to explore the extent to which a 
newly emerging social investment agenda 
is supported in public attitudes in various 
European countries characterised by diffe-
rent social context and welfare regimes, 
particularly whether the socialisation in 
particular welfare regime may constrain or 
enable policy reforms aimed at the increa-
sed state intervention in childcare. There-
fore, we have examined how the individual 
characteristics and broader contextual fac-
tors are associated with the probability of 
support for the government’s responsibility 
for childcare, as opposed to the responsi-
bility of other actors, in 24 European co-
untries. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Determinants of Welfare State 
Attitudes
Svallfors (2012b) argues that resear-
ch on welfare state attitudes is grounded 
on two approaches, a political economy 
approach and a political-sociological 
approach. The political economy approach 
claims that the welfare state attitudes re-
flect the self-interest of individuals. Based 
on rational choice arguments, this approach 
assumes that individuals will support tho-
se aspects of the welfare state from which 
they (may) gain personally. Therefore, the 
welfare state attitudes depend on citizens’ 
structural position, that is, on their socio-
economic situations or anticipated risks 
in their life cycle (e.g. Andreß & Heien, 
2001; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Cusack et 
al., 2006; Busemeyer et al., 2009; Goerres 
& Tepe, 2010). It is typically expected that 
(future) parents, women, full-time em-
ployed and “poorer” individuals are more 
supportive of childcare policies alleviating 
their responsibility (Cusack et al. 2006; 
Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 
2014). The welfare state attitudes are also 
influenced by the educational level, which 
has a negative effect on the support for 
redistributive policies (Andreß & Heien, 
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2001; Jæger, 2006a; for childcare policy 
Guo & Gilbert, 2014).1 
Still, individual self-interest has a li-
mited role in the formation of welfare 
state attitudes and a broader explanatory 
framework is needed to understand them 
(Svallfors 2012b). This argument was also 
supported by recent works exploring the 
attitudes towards the childcare policies. For 
example, Goerres & Tepe (2010) showed 
that age-based self-interest provides an 
oversimplified explanation of the forma-
tion of redistributive preferences, i.e. that 
the intergenerational solidarity within the 
family may change age-related policy pre-
ferences and result in the support for state 
intervention in childcare among the elderly 
as well. Moreover, Guo & Gilbert (2014) 
analysis indicates that the effect of self-
interest factors varies among the welfare 
regimes,2 implying that the attitudes towar-
ds childcare are context-dependant. Hence, 
the reasons for differences in attitudes must 
be sought out at the institutional level, as 
well as at the political, socio-economic and 
cultural level (see Goerres & Tepe, 2012; 
Guo & Gilbert, 2014). 
There has been some research on the 
self-interest at the aggregate level as well. 
For example, Blekesaune & Quadagno 
(2003) showed that support for welfare 
policies is higher in the context marked 
by high unemployment, and that unem-
ployment has stronger effect on the wel-
fare state attitudes on the aggregate level 
than at the individual level.3 Exploring 
the attitudes towards the childcare, Guo & 




ce of broader societal context. Admitted-
ly, they assessed solely a general effect of 
unmeasured factors in societal context, but 
Goerres & Tepe (2010) have estimated spe-
cific contextual self-interest variables and 
they have found that the elderly are more 
supportive of the public childcare provisi-
ons in the context marked by lower female 
labour market participation (e.g. Italy, Spa-
in), where the childcare provision have not 
been meet. 
The scholars of the political-sociologi-
cal approach try to move beyond the self-
interest arguing that a wider social context 
also has an important role in the formation 
and persistence of welfare state attitudes, 
notably a political ideology and/or sociali-
zation patterns, reflecting broader conside-
rations about social justice, social rights and 
reciprocity (e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno, 
2003; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Svallfors, 
2012a; Vučković Juroš, 2012; Guo & Gil-
bert, 2014). For example, it is expected that 
socialisation in a particular welfare regime 
or growing up in a religious community 
may influence citizens’ attitudes towards 
family life (see Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo 
& Gilbert, 2014). Modernity and indivi-
dualism may also play an important role 
(Daatland & Lowenstain, 2005), as well as 
the growing educational level of women or 
women’s greater participation in the labour 
market. These factors may operate at both 
individual and aggregate levels. 
At the individual level, the political-so-
ciological approach assumes that citizens’ 
support for welfare state is rooted in per-
sonal political values and beliefs and may 
1  Self-interest factors such as income, educational background, social class, employment status, age and gender 
are generally viewed as reflecting differences in (future) risk perception (Blomberg et al., 2012). However, they are 
also related to the differences in socialisation patterns (Andreß & Heien, 2001).
2  Solely having a child at home showed the same pattern among the regimes, contributing to greater support for 
government’s intervention in childcare. The perception of need and educational level were significant in the Liberal 
and Southern regimes, and gender in the Social-democratic and Continental regimes (Guo & Gilbert, 2014).
3  High unemployment may increase public empathy for the unemployed as there is a greater risk that one may 
become unemployed (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003).
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be explained by political orientation and 
ideological preferences (Jæger, 2006b). In 
general, greater support for egalitarian and 
social justice beliefs should result in grea-
ter support for redistributive policies (An-
dreß & Heien, 2001; Guo & Gilbert, 2014). 
There is also some evidence that the leftists 
are more supportive of the state support in 
the area of family policy (Goerres & Tepe, 
2012). Previous works have also controlled 
for age, gender, education, class and/or em-
ployment status, as it was believed that they 
determine socialization (see e.g. Andreß & 
Heien, 2001). However, these factors spe-
ak more about current structural position 
than about socialisation patterns, especially 
in the context of childcare policies. There-
fore, we treat them primarily as self-inte-
rest individual determinants, and focus on 
those factors that may reflect specificity of 
socialisation patterns at young age4 such as 
exposure to (non-)traditional gender role 
models. For example, McGinn et al.’s re-
search (2015) speaks of the importance of 
mother’s employment for adult men and 
women’s involvement in paid and unpaid 
work.5 Although this research examines 
actual practices, it suggests an importance 
of exposure to (non-)traditional gender role 
models for work and care-related attitudes. 
At the country level, the effect of po-
litical ideology, especially in the area of 
family policy is not clear (for a review, 
see Goerres & Tepe, 2012). Moreover, 
Bolzendahl’s research (2009) suggests that 
it is women’s legislative presence, which is 
not solely tied to the left parties, that has 
the strongest effect on higher social spen-
ding and not the left-wing governments by 
 
 
themselves. Comparative policy analysis of 
family policies in post-communist countri-
es suggests that this is particularly so in the 
area of family policies, since the women’s 
groups affiliated with political parties 
played an important role in development of 
family policies (Dobrotić, 2012). Finally, 
examinations of both the political ideology 
and socialization patterns give support 
to the regime thesis, which is tested by a 
growing body of research studying the link 
between the welfare state attitudes and 
the welfare regimes (e.g. Mau, 2004; Ja-
kobsen, 2011; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Vuč-
ković Juroš, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014). 
The welfare regimes are assumed to shape 
public preferences for the state interventi-
on in social area either through education 
and socialisation, or through daily interac-
tion with the welfare state institutions. On 
one hand individuals are taught to respect 
dominant values and norms of society (Ja-
kobsen, 2011) and, on the other hand, the 
implementation of social policies shapes 
citizens’ opinions about different social po-
licy programs and the need for redistributi-
on (Guo & Gilbert, 2014). As the welfare 
regimes have different histories, various 
institutional arrangements between the sta-
te, market and family, and are characterised 
by distinct political values and ideologies 
(Mau, 2004; Jakobsen, 2011; Svallfors, 
2012), one expects cross-country variation 
in the welfare state attitudes that are con-
sistent with the welfare regime typologies. 
Nevertheless, previous studies have not 
unequivocally supported the regime thesis. 
Some studies proved that welfare state atti-
tudes cluster around the welfare regimes, 
4  The effects of socialization patterns are the most pronounced at early age when the family is the most important 
agent (Goerres & Tepe, 2012), and the values and attitudes formed during the formative years remain stable through 
the life span (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Sears & Funk, 1999).
5  McGinn et al. (2015) showed that daughters raised by employed mothers are more likely to be employed, hold 
supervisory responsibility, work more hours, earn marginally higher wages and spend less time on housework than 
women whose mothers did not work. Also, sons raised by an employed mother spend more time caring for family 
members.
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while others found a limited effect of the 
welfare regimes on the welfare state attitu-
des or the correlation was not in the expec-
ted direction (e.g. Gelissen, 2000; Andreß 
& Heien, 2001; Jakobsen, 2011; Vučko-
vić Juroš, 2012). The similar is true of the 
childcare attitudes (Goerres & Tepe, 2010; 
Guo & Gilbert, 2014). These inconsistent 
findings are often attributed to conceptual 
and empirical problems with welfare regi-
me classifications (Svallfors, 2012), which 
are elaborated in more detail below.
Welfare Regimes and Childcare 
Attitudes
Comparative studies examining the re-
gime thesis are criticised for several con-
ceptual and empirical problems. First, the 
previously mentioned dependent variable 
problem (predominant reliance on the pu-
blic support for redistribution or the use 
of diverse aggregate indices as dependent 
variables) may have contributed to the in-
consistent findings of earlier studies (see 
Jæger, 2006a; Busemeyer et al., 2009; 
Jordan, 2013). These studies did not acco-
unt for citizens’ attitudes towards various 
characteristics and functions of the welfare 
state reflecting different theoretical dimen-
sions of attitudes (Jæger, 2006a), and for 
the difference in beliefs about the state res-
ponsibility and redistribution across diffe-
rent social policy areas (Svallfors, 2012a). 
Jæger’s solution (2006a) to this problem is 
restricting the analysis of regime differen-
ces on citizens’ support for redistribution, 
as more cross-national variation may be fo-
und in the preferred scope of redistribution 
than in the perception of the state responsi-
bility for people in need. In contrast, Jordan 
(2013) advocates a programmatic approach 
which we adopt in this paper. Jordan argues 
that the support for redistribution measures 
only one element of welfare state attitu-
des, i.e. redistribution from the rich to the 
poor, while programmatic approach allows 
linking public support for specific social 
programs to their unique structural charac-
teristics, and investigating the support for 
those programs that may not perfectly fit 
into a broader welfare regime type of a par-
ticular country.  
This brings up the second problem, 
the previous studies’ reliance on Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes 
which may fail to capture the internal di-
versity of welfare state design (Jæger, 
2006a; Jordan, 2013). Countries may have 
different approaches to welfare sectors, 
what may result in diverse levels and featu-
res of public support for various programs. 
Childcare policies are particularly sensiti-
ve to this criticism in light of the feminist 
scholars’ claims that Esping-Andersen’s 
typology is gender-blind and their pointing 
out that Esping-Andersen did not consider 
family policy when developing his typo-
logy. Several re-conceptualizations of Es-
ping-Andersen’s regime typology, therefo-
re, explored the implications of the welfare 
state on women’s position in the family and 
the labour market (see e.g. Lewis, 1992; 
Sainsbury, 1996; Korpi, 2000). While the-
se studies used various operational mea-
sures, their regime classifications are still 
very close to Esping-Andersen’s typology 
(Guo & Gilbert, 2012, 2014)6 and a bigger 
problem stems from analytical approaches 
which apply a reductionist notion of the 
 6  Countries which fit Korpi’s models (dual-earner, general family support and market-oriented) match the 
countries which fit into Lewis’s models (weak male breadwinner, modified male breadwinner and strong male 
breadwinner) and closely correspond to the conventional social democratic, conservative, and liberal regimes (Guo 
& Gilbert, 2012). In his later work, Esping-Andersen also found a consistency among the three welfare regimes and 
the degree of de-familialisation (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
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welfare regimes concept, i.e. which treat 
individual countries as manifestations of 
welfare regimes.7 Such studies actually 
analyse attitudinal cleavages within indi-
vidual countries, which for them represent 
particular welfare regimes, and fail to test a 
regime thesis per se (Blekesaune & Quada-
gno, 2003; Jæger, 2006a).  
The third concern is related to the appli-
cability of Esping-Andersen’s typology to 
current welfare states as the descriptive 
power of his regime classification may be 
undermined in light of the last two decades’ 
intensive reform processes (Jordan, 2013). 
While we are aware of this concern, we 
do not address it specifically in this paper 
as a more comprehensive reforms of the 
childcare policies started only recently in 
European countries and in this paper we 
focus on the effects of socialisation in a 
particular welfare regime on childcare atti-
tudes. Moreover, Goerres & Tepe (2012) 
showed that the welfare state attitudes are 
highly path-dependant and inter-individual 
differences in public support for childcare 
remain stable even in contexts marked by 
paradigmatic shifts in family policy. This 
stresses the importance of policy feedback 
effect, which claims that institutional and 
policy environment may have an important 
role in shaping the welfare state attitudes. 
Namely, existing policies may reshape in-
terests and create new interest groups hin-
dering the retrenchment of social programs 
(e.g. Pierson, 1994, 1996). Hence, altho-
ugh Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) are 
concerned about an assumption of one-way 
causation from policies to attitudes in stu-
dies testing the regime thesis, a historical 
institutionalism gives theoretical grounds 
for this premise. 
In spite of various criticisms, Esping-
Andersen’s typology remains the main 
 
welfare regime classification used in empi-
rical works. Although it underwent several 
re-conceptualisations based on different in-
dicators, they all resulted in similar classi-
fications and it has been shown that “three 
worlds of welfare capitalism” still have a 
heuristic value in analysing institutional 
arrangements (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). 
However, there is a case for extending the 
number of welfare regimes and it became 
widely accepted to situate Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and Greece into separate Mediterra-
nean or Southern regime as they share 
some similar characteristics, such as weak 
state institutions, political parties as main 
actors for interest articulation, ideological 
polarizations and a strong religious influ-
ence followed by the important role of the 
traditional family (Ferrera, 1996). For pra-
gmatic reasons, the post-communist coun-
tries are also often placed within the sepa-
rate, post-communist regime. Due to their 
common experience of communist statism 
these countries are expected to have similar 
expectations about the role of the state in 
social area (e. g. Vučković Juroš, 2012).
Esping-Andersen’ (1999) three welfa-
re regimes have the following characteri-
stics in the area of family policy. Social-
Democratic Regime is marked by strong 
government’s role, comprehensive child-
hood education and care system in which 
services are predominantly publicly pro-
vided and financed. Countries belonging 
to the Conservative-Corporatist Regime 
are organised around subsidiarity principle 
and their family policies have traditionally 
stressed the role of traditional family in 
childcare and discouraged a female labour 
market participation, which resulted in un-
derdeveloped early childhood education 
and care systems, especially for children 
under the age of three. The state interventi-
 7   When analysing a cross-national differences in the welfare state attitudes only one country is often treated as 
representing a particular regime (see e.g. Svallfors, 1997; Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Andreß & Heien, 2001).
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on in childcare is the lowest in Liberal Re-
gime, which favours the market in service 
provision and where one can find notice-
able class differences in childcare arran-
gements (see Michel & Mahon, 2002). In 
the extension of Esping-Andersen’s ty-
pology, countries of the Southern Regime 
are marked by underdeveloped early child-
hood education and care services (Bettio 
& Plantenga, 2004) and the widespread 
practice of informal care provision (e.g. 
Igel & Szydlik, 2011). The family policy 
in post-communist countries have often 
been labelled “refamilialised” (e.g. Hain-
trains, 2004) as it has been assumed that 
after  1990 they supported women to return 
to care by providing them  long leaves and 
lowering the state support for childcare.
These arguments pose challenges to 
the present paper. We can hardly treat the 
post-communist countries as a homogeneo-
us group when it comes to family policies. 
Namely, there are notable differences in fa-
mily policies in those countries, and many 
of them originate all the way back from the 
socialist period (see Inglot, 2008; Inglot et 
al., 2011; Dobrotić, 2012). Javornik (2014) 
showed that in the area of childcare polici-
es they share different core characteristics 
inherent to Esping-Andersen’s typology. 
For example, Slovenia and Lithuania sha-
re social democratic ideas of the Nordic 
countries which view childcare as a social 
responsibility; Hungary, the Czech Repu-
blic and Estonia give priority to financially 
supported family childcare; while Poland 
and Slovakia share some similarities with 
liberal regime as their policies are marked 
by a lack of public support for childcare. Si-
milar differences may also be found betwe-
en countries belonging to other regimes. 
For example, opposite to other members of 
Southern Regime, an emphasis on support 
for full-time dual earner parents in Portugal 
was followed by a growing availability of 
full-time childcare services. Similarly, whi-
le the Netherlands’ policy model has been 
closely connected to part-time work and 
part-time childcare provision, Germany 
and Austria have traditionally supported fa-
mily care, while France and Belgium have 
opted for a model that offers parents to cho-
ose between long leaves and childcare ser-
vices (Escobedo & Wall, 2015). Hence, it is 
advisable to test the regime thesis applying 
a more nuanced categorization of childcare 
policies.
One such categorization is Leitner’s 
(2003) “Varieties of Familialism” typo-
logy, which is more sensitive to the im-
plications of the welfare state on women’s 
position in the family and the labour mar-
ket, and specifically to the fact that policy 
affects allocation of childcare responsibili-
ties between the state, family and market, 
as well as within the family (see Table 1). 
This categorization, therefore, may better 
account for cross-national variations in 
childcare attitudes.8 Leitner developed a 
gender-sensitive classification based on the 
degree to which welfare states strengthen 
or unburden family in its caring function 
and reinforce gendered care giving. This 
classification groups countries into four 
regimes:9 Explicit Familialism, Implicit 
Familialism, Optional Familialism and De-
Familialism. Both the Explicit and Implicit 
Familialism strengthen the family role in 
childcare provision and lack an alternative 
to family care by not providing accessible 
 
 
8  Some countries which fit Esping-Andersen`s typology well change their position within Leitner`s typology. For 
example France, a typical representative of Conservative-Corporatist regime joins the Nordic countries in Leitner`s 
typology (see Table 1). 
9  In her work Leitner (2003) speaks about the ideal types of familialism, however, we used a widely accepted 
term regimes.
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and affordable childcare services. In Expli-
cit Familialism, this is done through the 
provision of family benefits, and in the Im-
plicit Familialism by not providing parents 
with any public support, which implicitly 
puts the responsibility for childcare within 
the family. In contrast, both the Optional 
Familialism and De-Familialism unburden 
family in its caring function. However, Op-
tional Familialism gives parents a possibi-
lity to choose between preferred forms of 
childcare (between the family care and the 
formal care), while De-Familialism does 
not actively support the family care and 
facilitates a participation of parents at the 
labour market through the state or market 
provision of care services. Although post-
communist countries were not initially 
included in this typology, Javornik (2014) 
applied Leitner’s “Varieties of Familiali-
sm” framework to eight post-communist 
countries that joined the EU in 2004. She 
concluded that Poland, Latvia and Slovakia 
belong to Implicit Familialism, as they do 
not provide public support to parents and 
the responsibility for childcare is impli-
citly placed within the family. Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Estonia were further 
classified into Explicit Familialism since 
they supported family childcare through 
longer paid parental leave and reinforced 
gendered parenting. However, Lithua-
nia and Slovenia did not fit into Leitner’s 
ideal types and were placed within a new 
ideal type, Supported De-Familialism, as 
their leave policies and childcare services 
are contingent on women’s continuous 
employment. Specifically, these countries 
“pragmatically shift social investment from 
familial childcare to public childcare in or-
der to facilitate women’s continuous em-
ployment” with the crossover point betwe-
en the two policy approaches located at the 
child’s first birthday (Javornik, 2014: 253).
The main goal of the present paper is 
to examine how both the individual and 
country-level socialization factors affect 
the childcare attitudes. However, in light 
of recent demands for the increased state 
intervention in the area of family policy 
at the European level and considering the 
complementarity of the political-sociologi-
cal approach to welfare state attitudes with 
the regime thesis, we will especially focus 
on examining whether socialization in a 
particular welfare regime influences attitu-
des about the state’s responsibility related 
to childcare. Despite all the challenges re-
lated to the welfare regime classifications 
and their consequent operationalizations, 
we consider the welfare regimes to be pre-
dictors of high explanatory power which 
stems in particular from the feedback loop 
between people’s preferences and expecta-
tions and the institutional persistence of 
certain policies (compare Brooks & Man-
za, 2007, Swallfors, 2012a). At the same 
time, the effects of socialization in welfare 
state regimes are still unclear in the current 
state of research, and we believe that our 
work can contribute to solving this puzzle. 
Specifically, in order to examine if indeed 
a more family-policy-nuanced categori-
zation of welfare regimes better captures 
cross-country variations in childcare po-
licies attitudes, our analyses will include 
both the classical Esping-Andersen’s typo-
logy of welfare regimes (extended with the 
Southern and Post-Communist Regime) 
and Leitner’s “Varieties of Familialism” ty-
pology (extended with Javornik’s Suppor-
ted De-Familialism Regime).
DATA, MEASURES AND 
METHODS
The individual-level data in this study 
is based on the Family and Changing Gen-
der Roles IV Module from the 2012 Inter-
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national Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 
which examines attitudes on family life and 
marriage, gender and gender roles. In this 
study we focus exclusively on 24 European 
countries that were part of the 2012 ISSP. 
The individual-level data is complemented 
by the country-level data from the World 
Bank (1997, 2011), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP, 2015) 
and the World Religion Dataset 1945-2010 
(Maoz & Henderson, 2013).
Dependent Variable: Primary Res-
ponsibility for Childcare Cost for Child 
under School Age
We use the variable measuring attitudes 
on who is primarily responsible for cove-
ring childcare cost for child under school 
age as a dependent variable.10 This varia-
ble was originally measured as a nominal 
variable consisting of three discrete choi-
ces: family, government/public funds and 
employers. However, considering that the 
multilevel analysis on nominal responses 
is computationally quite intense, and that 
the third category “employers” was cho-
sen by only 2.94% respondents, we deci-
ded to exclude it from the main analyses 
which were, instead, conducted on the 
dichotomous response where the choices 
for the primary responsibility for childca-
re cost were the family (chosen by 51.56% 
of respondents in the original variable) and 
the government/public funds (chosen by 
45.50% of respondents in the original va-
riable). However, we also ran additional 
analyses examining which respondents had 
 
the highest probability of choosing “em-
ployers” vs. “family” or “government/pu-
blic funds” as being primarily responsible 
for covering childcare cost. The informati-
on on all the variables used in the analyses 
is available from Table 2. 
Independent Variable: Two Classifi-
cations of the Welfare Regime Types
Table 1 presents the categorization of 
24 countries included in this analysis into 
both the Classical Esping-Andersen’s and 
Leitner’s “Varieties of Familialism” Clas-
sifications (with their extensions). Due to 
the post-communist legacy of East Ger-
many, we analyse East and West Germany 
separately. Where possible, we followed 
the classifications of countries found in 
the literature. However, some countries 
were more problematic. Iceland was not 
included in the original Esping-Andersen’s 
classification and it does not fit well into 
Esping-Andersen’s typology. It is usually 
described as a mixture of Nordic/Social-
Democratic and Liberal models, as there 
is an emphasis on universal social security, 
but the role of the state is less extensive 
than in other Nordic countries and there 
is a greater accent on flat-rate and means-
tested benefits. However, since public ser-
vices are well developed, and the provision 
of childcare services is quite extensive and 
an essential part of social policy (Björk 
Eydal and Ólafsson, 2016), we consider 
Iceland as a member of Social-Democratic 
Regime. Leitner (2003) classified Finland 
as belonging to Optional Familialism de-
10  We initially planned to compare the analyses on the dependent variable „Primary responsibility for 
covering childcare cost for child one year under school age“ with the analyses on the dependent variable „Primary 
responsibility for providing childcare for child one year under school age“. However, the use of the latter variable 
was not possible due to the missing values on most explanatory variables being predicted by the providing childcare 
variable. This excluded the possibility of using listwise deletion as a method of treating missing data in the analyses 
with the providing childcare variable as a dependent variable. As this was also a five-category nominal variable, we 
were unable to implement alternative missing data treatments (such as multiple imputation) since the combination 
of such methods with multilevel analysis of nominal responses is, to our knowledge, currently impossible in the 
conventional statistical software.
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spite it being borderline case between Op-
tional and Explicit Familialism. We follow 
this classification. Finally, based on their 
childcare policy strategies and theoretical 
premises of Leitner’s and Javornik’s ideal 
types, we classified Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Hungary as Explicit Familialism countries, 
Iceland as Supported De-Familialism, Nor-
way as Optional Familialism and Switzer-
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Self-Interest Controls
We control for self-interest variables 
that may influence support for childca-
re policies, both at the individual and at 
the aggregate/country level (see Table 2). 
At the individual level, we include con-
trols for gender, age and education (the 
highest completed degree), as well as for 
the legal partnership status of the respon-
dent (married/in civil partnership or not), 
the respondent and/or their partner being 
in paid work (both of them, one of them, 
neither of them)11 and the number of young 
children in the household (in each coun-
try, this included children up to one year 
before school age).12 At the country level, 
we control for country’s unemployment le-
vel in 2011, a year before the onset of the 
survey (grand-mean centred, World Bank/
International Labour Organization /ILO/), 
country’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) in 2011, which is a summary mea-
sure of health, education and standard of 
living in a country that we take as an indi-
cator of its modernization level (grand-me-
an centred, UNDP), and country’s female 
labour force participation in 2011 (grand-
mean centred, World Bank/modelled ILO 
estimates). 
Socialization Controls
At the individual level, we control for 
the effects of socialization by including 
two measures of belonging to a religious 
community: religious affiliation and atten-
dance of religious services once a month 
or more often. We also examine exposure 
to (non)traditional gender role models at 
a young age by controlling whether the 
respondent’s mother worked for pay be-
fore they were 14.13 Further, in addition to 
the welfare regime type, which is our in-
dependent variable, we use the following 
socialization controls at the country level: 
women’s involvement in formal political 
system, which is measured both by the pro-
portion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments in 2011 and by the change in 
the proportion of parliamentary seats held 
by women between 1997 and 2011 (grand-
mean centred, World Bank/Inter-Parlia-
mentary Union), and country’s religious 
tradition.14 The details on the socialization 
controls are available from Table 2. 
11  In analyses, we treat this as an ordinal variable where the households with both respondent and partner/spouse 
are considered least vulnerable, and the households with neither of them in paid work as the most vulnerable.
12  Unfortunately, due to the characteristics of the ISSP dataset, we were not able to include more specific 
measures of the socio-economic status such as income or class measure. The dataset currently does not provide 
an internationally comparable measure of income, and the International Socio-Economic Index (calculated from 
the occupation measure ISCO-88) has a large number of missing data, which would make a listwise deletion, our 
preferred method of dealing with the missing values in this analysis, impossible (see Missing Data section for further 
details). The similar problem exists with the subjective measure of respondent’s status, the variable asking for self-
placement on the top or bottom in society on a 10-point scale.
13  We were unable to include a control of individual political ideology, since the only available such measure, 
party voted for in the last election placed on the left-right continuum, included a large number of missing values.
14  Country’s religious tradition was determined based on three sources. First, we used the CIA World Factbook 
to determine which religious tradition has most adherents in a particular country according to its last census. Then 
we checked the correspondence of this data with the Pew Research Center’s data on Religious Composition by 
Country in 2010. However, since in determining the religious tradition, historic religious heritage may be more 
relevant than current religious composition, our final conclusion was based on trends in religious composition in 
each country since World War Two in the World Religion Dataset. Several countries (such as the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Great Britain, Latvia, Belgium and Netherlands) have in this period experienced decreasing numbers of 
religious adherents and increasing numbers of unaffiliated individuals, but we have based our final categorization on 
the religious tradition that has been dominant through the years, even if weakened in recent years. 
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Table 2
Variable used in the Analyses (pooled sample of 24 countries)
Variable Description and Metric Mean SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (individual-level)
Primarily responsible for cost of childcare (I) 1=Govt/Public Funds, 0=Family 0.47 0.50 





































Gender (Female) 1=Female, 0=Male   0.55   0.50
Age (centred at 18) In years 31.40 17.24
Education (Highest completed degree)
0=No formal education, 
1=Primary school,
2=Lower secondary (does not allow en-
try to university: obligatory school),
3=Upper secondary (allows entry to uni-
versity or to entry other ISCED level 3 
programs),
4=Post-secondary, non-tertiary (geared 
towards labour market or technical for-
mation),
5=Lower level tertiary, first stage (also 
technical schools at a tertiary level),













Legal partnership: married or in civil 
Partnership 1=Yes, 0=No
0.58 0.49
Number of children in household up to one 
year before school age Range of data: 0-5
0.17 0.48
Respondent or partner/spouse in paid work 0 (both in paid work) – 2 (neither in paid work)
1.03 0.83
Mother worked for pay before respondent 


















Attendance of religious services once a 
month or more often 1=Yes, 0=No
0.21 0.40
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Method of Analysis and the Missing 
Data
We estimated the data using multi-le-
vel modelling for binary outcomes with 
logit link in Stata 12.1 (xtmelogit), which 
uses Full Maximum Likelihood Method 
(FML) with numerical integration (adap-
tive Gaussian quadrature). The multi-le-
vel modelling takes into consideration the 
clustered structure of the data (individuals 
clustered in countries), and the FML with 
numerical integration allows for testing the 
fit of the model and the significance of the 
random parts by likelihood ratio tests (Snij-
ders & Bosker, 1999.).
The main analyses on the dependent 
variable “Choosing Government/Public 
Funds vs Family as being Primarily Res-
ponsible for Childcare Cost for Child un-
der School Age” were conducted on all the 
respondents who have chosen either go-
vernment or family in the original ISSP va-
riable, and who, furthermore, had full infor-
mation on all the variables included in the 
models (the latter led to the loss of 10.93% 
of the data). This included 27,746 indivi-
Variable Description and Metric Mean SD
Country-level:
Unemployment level in 2011* % of labour force, ages 15+, Range of data: -6.35 – 12.05
0.00 4.98
Human Development Index in 2011* Range of data: -0.10 – 0.06 0.00 0.04
Female labour force participation in 2011* % of female population ages 15+,Range of data: -0.10 – 0.16
0.00 0.06
Proportion of seats held by women in nation-
al parliaments in 2011* Range of data: -0.20 – 0.16
0.00 0.10
Change in proportion of seats held by wom-















Sources: ISSP 2012, World Bank 2011, UNDP 2011, World Religion Dataset 1945-2010.
* Variables centred at grand mean.
** Catholic/Protestant mix for Germany (East and West), the Netherlands and Switzerland, and Catholic/Protestant/
Orthodox mix for Latvia.
duals in 24 countries. We also conducted 
additional analyses on all the respondents 
who have chosen government, family or 
employers in the original ISSP variable, 
and who additionally had full information 
on all the variables included in the models 
(the latter led to the loss of 11.04% of the 
data). This included 28,606 individuals in 
24 countries.
In both the main and the additional 
analyses we treated the missing data by 
the conventional method of the listwise 
deletion. Although this method has been 
criticized for the possibility of inflating 
standard errors and producing biased esti-
mates, it has also been shown that this is the 
method most robust to violations of MAR 
pattern (missing-at-random) in regression 
analyses, as long as the independent va-
riables do not depend on the values of the 
dependent variable (Allison, 2002). After 
checking for the latter with a series of lo-
gistic regressions of dummy variables with 
missing data on each variable considered 
for the analysis of all possible dependent 
variables,  we included only those varia-
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bles in the modelling that do not violate 
this condition (that is, whose missing valu-
es were not predicted by the dependent va-
riable of our analysis). We then proceeded 
to use the listwise deletion as the simplest 
method. Using any other method would be 
computationally much more intensive and 
at times even impossible considering that 
we are using a method of analysis that is in 
itself computationally complex (multilevel 
modelling for binary outcomes). 
RESULTS
Main Analysis: Choosing Government/
Public Funds vs Family as being Primarily 
Responsible for Childcare Cost for Child 
under School Age
Descriptive statistics suggests a varia-
tion between countries in the beliefs as to 
who is primarily responsible for childcare. 
As seen from Table 3, over 70% respon-
dents from countries such as East Germany, 
Sweden and Iceland believe that financing 
of childcare is the responsibility of go-
vernment/public funds.  In contrast, this is 
a minority view in countries such as Hun-
gary, the Netherlands, Croatia and Switzer-
land (30% or less share it), and particularly 
in Bulgaria (only 15% of respondents cho-
se government/public funds over family). 
After estimating the so-called empty model 
with no explanatory variables, we calcu-
lated its intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC) which suggests that 13.55% of va-
riance in the choice of government/public 
funds over family is due to between-coun-
try variation. Therefore, we proceeded with 
the multilevel modelling for binary outco-
mes in order to identify factors contributing 
to this variation (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).
Table 3
Proportions and Standard Errors of Primary Responsibility for Childcare Cost for Child under 
School Age (1= Government/Public Funds; 0 = Family)








Germany East Post-Communist Optional Familialism 0.77 0.02 503
Sweden Social-Democratic Optional Familialism 0.74 0.01 973
Iceland Social-Democratic Supported de-Familial-ism 0.73 0.01 1032
Slovenia Post-Communist Supported de-Familial-ism 0.67 0.02 925
Austria Conservative-Corporatist Explicit Familialism 0.61 0.02 1045
Finland Social-Democratic Optional Familialism 0.59 0.02 1000
Slovakia Post-Communist Implicit Familialism 0.58 0.02 1069
Germany West Conservative-Corporatist Explicit Familialism 0.56 0.02 1061
Lithuania Post-Communist Supported de-Familial-ism 0.54 0.02 1010
Spain Southern Implicit Familialism 0.53 0.01 2328
Czech Republic Post-Communist Explicit Familialism 0.52 0.01 1680
Latvia Post-Communist Implicit Familialism 0.49 0.02 971
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Norway Social-Democratic Optional Familialism 0.46 0.01 1289
France Conservative-Corporatist Optional Familialism 0.42 0.01 1838
Denmark Social-Democratic Optional Familialism 0.40 0.01 1289
Poland Post-Communist Implicit Familialism 0.39 0.02 1043
Belgium Conservative-Corporatist Optional Familialism 0.39 0.01 1819
Ireland Liberal De-Familialism 0.37 0.02 1020
Great Britain Liberal De-Familialism 0.35 0.02 781
Hungary Post-Communist Explicit Familialism 0.30 0.01 975
Netherlands Conservative-Corporatist Explicit Familialism 0.30 0.01 1065
Croatia Post-Communist Explicit Familialism 0.30 0.01 952
Switzerland Conservative-Corporatist De-Familialism 0.24 0.01 1134
Bulgaria Post-Communist Explicit Familialism 0.15 0.01 962
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Our results suggest two main findings. 
First, the models with “Varieties of Fami-
lialism” welfare regimes better explain the 
between-country variation in the support 
for government/public funds over family 
as financially responsible for childcare than 
the classical operationalization of welfare 
regimes. Specifically, the respondents from 
“Supported De-Familialism” and “Optional 
Familialism” are most likely to believe that 
government/public funds are responsible for 
childcare financing. Second, in models with 
“Varieties of Familialism” welfare regimes, 
no other country-level covariates have a sta-
tistically significant effect on the preference 
for government/public funds, but there is a 
significant effect of individual-level covaria-
tes: increased age (with diminishing effects, 
though), having a MA/PhD degree, religious 
belonging, having more young children in 
the household and the exposure to the wor-
king mother at a young age. However, our 
results also suggest that the effects of the last 
two variables should be considered together 
with the effects of the regime types.
These conclusions are based on esti-
mating eight multilevel models (see Table 
4).  Model 1 (random intercept model) and 
Model 2 (fixed-effects random coefficient 
model of within-group variability) examine 
the significance of the individual-level cova-
riates. These results suggests that age, edu-
cation, religious affiliation, whether mother 
worked for pay before the respondent was 
14 and a number of young children in a ho-
usehold all have significant effects on cho-
osing government/public funds vs. family 
as being primarily responsible for childcare 
cost.  
In Models 3-6 we included country-level 
covariates in order to explicitly examine 
between-country variability (fixed-effects 
models). We provide parallel analyses for 
classical welfare regimes (Models 3 and 5) 
and for “Varieties of Familialism” welfare 
regimes (Model 4 and 6). The lower AIC sta-
tistics (see Table 4) and the likelihood ratio 
tests suggest that models with country-level 
covariates provide a better fit than models 
with only individual-level covariates. Fur-
ther, there are clear differences in the effects 
of covariates in the models with classical 
welfare regimes and the models with “Vari-
eties of Familialism” welfare regimes.
First, when comparing Models 3 and 4, 
which include only significant individual-
level covariates and all country-level covari-
ates, we see that classical regime categories 
are not jointly statistically significant in 
predicting the choice of government/public 
funds over family (Model 3). In contrast, 
the “Varieties of Familialism” welfare re-
gimes remain jointly statistically significant 
for that choice (Wald test: χ2(4) =12.40, 
p<0.05).  Second, in both Models 3 and 4, 
most other country-level covariates have no 
statistically significant effect (p<0.05) on 
the preference for government/public funds. 
However, there is one important difference – 
in the Model 3 with (non-significant) classi-
cal regime categories, the effect of country’s 
religious tradition on the preference for gov-
ernment/public funds is statistically signifi-
cant (p<0.05), while the country’s religious 
tradition is not statistically significant in the 
Model 4 with the “Varieties of Familialism” 
welfare regimes.
After examining AIC statistics (see 
Table 3) and the likelihood ratio tests, we 
proceed with the Model 6 as our final fixed-
effects model. The Model 6 with “Varieties 
of Familialism” welfare regimes and with-
out country’s religious tradition has better 
fit than all previous models, and also than 
the Model 5 (LR χ2(1) = 4.38, p<0.05)15, 
which is the final solution to model build-
15  Likelihood ratio test (LR test) measures differences in deviances between two models fitted to the same 
dataset (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The null hypothesis for this test is that the restricted model is a better fit than 
unrestricted model, where both are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
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ing with classical regime categories – the 
model without regime categories, but with 
jointly significant religious tradition cat-
egories. The Model 6, then, indicates that 
age (with quadratic function), education, 
individuals’ religious affiliation, and “Va-
rieties of Familialism” welfare regime are 
statistically significant predictors (p<0.05) 
of choosing government/public funds over 
family as being primarily responsible for 
childcare cost. This model, πij= logistic (γ00 
+ γ20 ageij + γ30 agesqij + γ4-9,0 educationij + 
γ11,0 youngchildrenij + γ13,0 motherworkedij 
+ γ15-18,0 religiousaffiliationij + γ0,5-8 VFregi-
meij + u0j), explains 21.52 % of variation in 
the outcome.
Table 5
Coefficients, average predicted probabilities, odds ratios and percent changes for each variable 
from Model 6 for outcome Choosing Government/Public Funds vs Family as being Primarily 
Responsible for Childcare Cost 




ge in odds (%)
Age 0.0021 0.46 – 0.50
(18 – 101 ye-
ars)**
1.002 +0.2
Age Squared -0.0002* 0.9998 -0.02
Education Categories)
No Formal Education -0.10 0.48 0.909 -9.1
Primary -0.13 0.47 0.875 -12.5
Lower Secondary -0.11* 0.48 0.899 -10.1
Upper Secondary -0.15* 0.47 0.864 -13.6
Post-secondary/Non-tertiary -0.18* 0.46 0.837 -16.3
Lower Tertiary -0.15* 0.47 0.864 -13.6
Upper Tertiary Reference 0.51 Reference Reference
Number of Children in Household up 
to 1 year before School Age 0.18*
0.47 – 0.67
(0 – 5 chil-
dren)**
1.195 +19.5
Mother Worked for Pay before R 
was 14 0.07* 0.48 1.076 +7.6
Religious Affiliation Categories
No religion Reference 0.50 Reference Reference
Catholic -0.11* 0.48 0.896 -10.4
Protestant -0.21* 0.45 0.811 -18.9
Orthodox -0.17 0.46 0.840 -16.0
Other 0.03 0.51 1.027 +2.7
Varieties of Familialism Regimes
Optional Familialism Reference 0.55 Reference Reference
Explicit Familialism -0.11* 0.28 0.497 -50.3
De-Familialism -0.21* 0.31 0.369 -63.1
Supported De-Familialism -0.17 0.66 1.604 +60.4
Implicit Familialism 0.03 0.50 0.809 -19.1
* p < 0.05
**Range of average predicted probabilities from minimum to maximum value of the variable.
1 The average predicted probability for observed data, that is, the average probability of outcome if everyone in the data 
was treated as if they had the value of the variable in question (from fixed part of the model only).  
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For better understanding of differences 
between various “Varieties of Familiali-
sm” regimes, we now present a graphical 
representation of predicted probabilities of 
choosing government/public funds over fa-
mily for a typical respondent from Model 
6 (Graph 1). This illustration suggests that 
respondents from Supported De-Familiali-
sm welfare regime are most likely to support 
government as the provider of childcare 
cost. Further, in Table 5 we present the ave-
rage predicted probabilities which also put 
the individuals from Supported De-Famili-
alism at the top, followed by the individu-
als from Optional Familialism (there are no 
statistical significant differences between 
the two). On the other side are the respon-
dents from Explicit Familialism and De-
Familialism whose predicted probabilities 
of choosing government rather than family 
as providers of childcare cost are the lowest 
(there are no statistical significant differen-
ces between the two). The results from Mo-
del 6 show that the differences in predicted 
probability of choosing government rather 
than family between Supported De-Fami-
lialism regimes and Explicit Familialism 
(χ2(1) = 8.90, p<0.05) and De-Familialism 
(χ2(1) = 9.98, p<0.05) are statistically signi-
ficant. The same is true of the differences 
between Optional Familialism and Explicit 
Familialism (χ2(1) = 5.26, p<0.05) and De-
Familialism (χ2(1) = 6.42, p<0.05)
Graph 1
Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Government/Public Funds (vs. Family) as Primarily Res-
ponsible for Childcare Cost (from fixed part of Model 6 only)*
Graph 1 
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Further examination of Model 6 shows 
that although age with its quadratic func-
tion remains jointly significant (Wald test: 
χ2(2) = 81.25, p<0.05), as they were in 
earlier models as well, the coefficients for 
both age and its 2nd order polynomial func-
tion are quite small (see Table 4). Again, 
this is well illustrated in Graph 1 where the 
change in predicted probability for suppor-
ting government for a typical respondent 
in different regimes across years of age is 
very mild. For the ease of interpretation, 
we have presented odds ratios and percent 
changes in odds for Model 6 in Table 5. The 
figures suggest that for an increase in each 
year of age, the probability of supporting 
government increases 0.2%, but that this 
increase decelerates 0.02% for each year, 
holding other covariates constant (see Ta-
ble 5). In Model 6, education categories 
are also jointly significant (Wald test: χ2(6) 
= 15.89, p<0.05). Specifically, we observe 
that those most highly educated (upper ter-
tiary degree) stand out in their probability to 
support government/public funds (see Table 
5). They do not differ significantly from tho-
se with least education (only primary scho-
ol or no formal schooling), but individuals 
with Master or PhD are statistically signifi-
cantly more likely to support government/
public funds as providers of childcare costs 
than those who have degrees from secon-
dary, post-secondary / non-tertiary and 
lower tertiary education (see Table 4). The 
greatest difference is between those with 
upper tertiary and post-secondary / non-
tertiary degrees, as belonging to the latter 
group decreases the odds of supporting go-
vernment/public funds as responsible for 
childcare cost for 16.3% compared to those 
most highly educated, holding other cova-
riates constant (see Table 5). 
Religious belonging also seems to have 
an impact, where those with the Protestant 
religious affiliation have the lowest proba-
bility of supporting government over family 
(Table 5). However, in their preferences 
Protestants do not differ significantly from 
the Catholic and Orthodox individuals, alt-
hough they do differ significantly from in-
dividuals with no religious affiliation (Wald 
test: χ2(1) = 18.76, p<0.05) and those with 
other religious affiliation (Wald test: χ2(1) 
= 10.20, p<0.05). Catholics are also signi-
ficantly less likely to believe government 
is responsible for childcare cost than tho-
se with no religious affiliation (Wald test: 
χ2(1) = 7.78, p<0.05) and those with other 
religious affiliation (Wald test: χ2(1) = 4.15, 
p<0.05). Indeed, the last two groups have 
the highest average predicted probability of 
supporting government (see Table 5). 
Finally, the probability of choosing go-
vernment over family as responsible for 
childcare cost is affected by the number of 
young children in the household and by the 
exposure to the non-traditional family model 
(mother working before the respondent was 
14). Those individuals whose mothers wor-
ked have 7.6% higher odds of supporting 
government than those whose mothers did 
not work. Also, for every additional young 
child in the household, the odds of believing 
government is responsible for childcare cost 
are increased for 19.5%, holding all other 
covariates constant (see Table 5). 
The results presented above are based 
on our final fixed-effects model, Model 6. 
However, in our final two models (Model 
7 and Final Model in Table 4) we included 
random slopes for two individual-level va-
riables from Model 6 (the number of young 
children and having a working mother) that, 
we suspected, may function differently in 
different regimes. The results of likeliho-
od ratio tests comparing models with and 
without random slopes for the two models 
which, respectively, included a random 
slope for number of young children and a 
random slope for a working mother suggest 
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that this, indeed, may be the case. Model 
7, therefore, included the random slopes 
for both of these variables. We also inclu-
ded cross-level interactions of the number 
of young children and the mother working 
with the “varieties of familialism” regimes 
in an attempt to account for some of the va-
riation in the random slopes, and we tested 
for their significance. In our final Random 
Effects Model (Final model in Table 4) we 
include only statistically significant cross-
level interactions: Supported De-Familia-
lism Regime x Number of young children, 
and Implicit Familialism x Mother worked 
before respondent was 14. The likeliho-
od ratio tests as well as the AIC statistics 
(see Table 4) suggest that our Final model 
with two random slopes and significant 
cross-level interactions is a better fit for 
the data than the model with fixed effects 
(LR test: χ2(4) = 21.40, p<0.05) and the 
model with both random slopes, but no 
cross-level interactions (LR test: χ2(2) = 
9.27, p<0.05). This model πij= logistic (γ00 
+ γ20 ageij + γ30 agesqij + γ4-9,0 educationij + 
γ11,0 youngchildrenij + γ13,0 motherworkedij 
+ γ15-18,0 religiousaffiliationij + γ0,5-8 VFre-
gimeij + γ11,07 youngchildren*SDFij + γ13,08 
motherworked*IF + u0j + u1jyoungchildrenij 
+ u2jmotherworkedij), explains 24.09% of 
variation in the outcome. 
The results from the Final Random 
Effects Model do not change the main in-
terpretation of all other covariates, as pre-
sented on the basis of Model 6, but they do 
suggest that the main effects of a number 
of young children in the household and the 
exposure to the working mother at a young 
age should be considered together with the 
effects of the interaction with regime types. 
Specifically, our Final Model suggests that 
the individuals whose mother worked befo-
re they were 14 are statistically significantly 
more likely to support government as a pro-
vider of childcare cost in Implicit Familia-
lism regime than in Optional Familialism 
regime. Also, a greater number of young 
children in their household makes individu-
als from Supported De-Familialism regime 
statistically significantly more likely to cho-
ose government as responsible for childcare 
cost than the individuals with a larger num-
ber of young children in Optional Familia-
lism regime. 
Additional Analysis: Choosing 
Employers as being Primary 
Responsible for Childcare Cost for 
Child under School Age
On the original ISSP variable asking re-
spondents who is primarily responsible for 
childcare cost (government/public funds, 
family itself or employers), only 2.94% has 
chosen employers. We considered such a 
small minority disregardable for the pur-
poses of our main analyses. Nevertheless, 
we have conducted additional analyses 
to see what increases the probability of 
choosing such a minority option vs. choos-
ing government or family as providers of 
childcare cost. In these analyses, we have 
conducted steps of model building similar 
to the ones described in our main analysis, 
but as this is not of our main interest, we 
will not go into details. Instead, we will 
present our final model only: πij= logistic 
(γ00 + γ10 femaleij + γ20 ageij + γ30 agesqij 
+ γ0,1-4Cregimeij + u0j). This Fixed Effects 
model contains only statistically significant 
predictors (p<0.05) of choosing employ-
ers vs. government or family: age with its 
quadratic function (jointly statistically sig-
nificant: χ2(2) = 11.69, p<0.05) and gender 
at individual-level, and the welfare regime 
categories at country-level (see Table 6). 
This model suggests that females are more 
likely to belong to the minority group be-
lieving that employers are responsible for 
childcare cost and that with the increase in 
the years of age, individuals are less likely 
to choose employers vs. government or 
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family, although this decrease also happens 
at the slower rate with each year. Finally, 
a particularly interesting finding is that in 
choosing the minority option of employers 
and not the more typical options of govern-
ment or family, it is the classical welfare 
regimes that prove jointly statistically sig-
nificant, and not the “varieties of familial-
ism” regimes as in the main analyses. Spe-
cifically, as illustrated in Graph 2, the re-
spondents from Southern regimes have the 
highest predicted probability of choosing 
employers, followed by the respondents 
from Conservative-Corporatist regimes 
(there are no statistically significant differ-
ences between the two). At the bottom are 
the respondents from Social-Democratic 
regimes who cluster together with the re-
spondents from the Post-communist re-
gimes (there are no statistically significant 
differences between the two). The statis-
tically significant difference in the prob-
ability of choosing the minority option of 
employers exist between the Social Demo-
cratic regimes and Southern (χ2(1) = 6.88, 
p<0.05), Conservative-Corporatist (χ2(1) = 
17.23, p<0.05) and Liberal regimes (χ2(1) 
= 5.68, p<0.05). Also, there are statistically 
significant differences between Post-com-
munist and Conservative-Corporatist (χ2(1) 
= 12.27, p<0.05) and Southern regimes 
(χ2(1) = 3.96, p<0.05). 
Table 6
Multi-Level Model of Choosing Employers vs Government or Family as being Primarily Res-
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Graph 2
Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Employers (vs. Government or Family) as Primarily Res-
ponsible for Childcare Cost for Females (from fixed part of the model only)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION    
This paper examined how the individu-
al and country-level socialization factors 
affect the childcare attitudes, particularly 
whether socialization in a particular wel-
fare regime influences attitudes about the 
state’s responsibility related to childca-
re. We also investigated whether a more 
family-policy-nuanced categorization of 
welfare regimes better accounts for cross-
country variations in the attitudes towards 
childcare. The welfare state attitudes are 
a complex phenomenon and citizens may 
hold various attitudes towards different as-
pects of welfare state. Due to methodologi-
Responsible for Childcare Cost for Females (from fixed part of the model only) 
 
cal limitations, we focused our analysis on 
one aspect of childcare attitudes only, their 
financial dimension, excluding other di-
mensions such as functional dimension of 
the welfare state, i.e. weather the childcare 
provision should even be among the func-
tions of the welfare state. However, as An-
dreß & Heien (2001) stressed, the attitudes 
towards the functions of welfare state are 
contingent on the attitudes towards other 
dimensions of welfare state (means, effects 
and financing) – therefore, if citizens see no 
governmental responsibility for ensuring 
social security, they will not consider sta-
te financially responsible for childcare. An 
analysis organised around attitudes towards 
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financial dimension of childcare is thus a 
legitimate approach and it may well grasp 
variations in citizens’ attitudes towards the 
government’s role in childcare. 
The findings convey a complex picture 
of determinants associated with the atti-
tudes towards the government’s role in 
childcare. The direction of the relationship 
of significant predictors generally follows 
the pattern usually reported in the literatu-
re. Support for higher government’s invol-
vement in financing of childcare is closely 
connected to one’s structural position and 
socialization patterns. An important fin-
ding of our study shows that the “Varieties 
of Familialism” typology (Leitner, 2003) 
better accounts for cross-national variati-
ons in childcare attitudes than the classical 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology 
of welfare regimes. Leitner’s typology 
provides a more family-policy-nuanced 
categorization of welfare regimes which 
is more sensitive to cross-national diffe-
rences in childcare policies and practices, 
so this finding supports the importance 
of applying a programmatic approach in 
analyses of welfare state attitudes which 
allows linking public support for specific 
social programs to its unique characteri-
stics (see Jordan, 2013). That is particularly 
important when analysing the welfare state 
attitudes in social policy areas which may 
not perfectly fit into the broader welfare 
regime of a particular country. Childcare 
policies are one such area, as the policy 
logics underlying the development of early 
childhood education and care programs is 
not principally concerned with redistributi-
on issues, but it is often guided by different 
motives, such as work-family balance or 
the importance of early education (Scheiwe 
& Willekens, 2009). This may increase the 
support for government’s involvement in 
childcare provision even in welfare regi-
mes that otherwise prioritize other actors 
in dealing with social issues or which are 
more residual in general character. Based 
on these findings, we propose the necessity 
of problematizing the criteria used in defi-
ning certain welfare-state typology before 
automatically considering its effects on 
a particular policy area. Additionally, the 
problem of utilizing the classical Esping-
Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology of wel-
fare regimes in explaining cross-national 
variations in childcare attitudes may beco-
me particularly pronounced in the analyses 
that involve post-communist countries and 
classify them as one, post-communist clu-
ster, since this is based more on general 
characteristics of the welfare regime in the-
se countries, rather than on actual charac-
ter of their childcare policies. Specifically, 
while the post-communist countries may 
have similar expectations about the role 
of the state in social area due to common 
experience of communist statism (see Vuč-
ković Juroš, 2012), they are also marked by 
important differences in family policy le-
gacy with some of them giving higher pri-
ority to public childcare at the earliest age, 
and the others stressing the importance of 
the family (see e. g. Inglot, 2008; Inglot et 
al., 2011; Dobrotić, 2012). Hence, due to 
different policy logics behind the deve-
lopment of family policies in these coun-
tries, as well as a variety of already esta-
blished childcare practices, and following 
policy feedback arguments (e.g. Goerres & 
Tepe, 2012, Pierson, 1994, 1996), one sho-
uld expect that they are also going to favour 
different actors in the childcare financing, 
as this paper demonstrates.
The findings in this paper indicate that 
welfare regime practices and ideologies 
are closely related with citizens’ welfare 
expectations. The “Varieties of Familiali-
sm” regimes predicted the public support 
for the government’s role in childcare in 
an expected way. The  higher support for 
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the government’s financing of childcare 
was found in the countries of those regimes 
which are marked by comprehensive early 
childhood education and care systems, pre-
dominantly publicly provided and financed 
(Supported De-familialism and Optional Fa-
milialism). In contrast, the support was lower 
in the countries which implicitly or expli-
citly supported the family in its caring func-
tion, and which were characterized by the 
lack of state involvement in early childhood 
education and care provision or financing 
(De-familialism and Explicit Familialism).16 
Given the fact that a policy emphasis in the 
latter countries is put on childcare as a pri-
vate, rather than family responsibility, this 
finding  is not surprising as it speaks about 
citizens’ lower welfare expectations in the 
area of childcare financing. 
Another interesting finding is that the 
individual self-interest and socialization 
factors vary among the welfare regimes. 
Individuals whose mother worked before 
they were 14 were more likely to support 
government’s involvement in financing 
of childcare in Implicit Familialism than 
in Optional Familialism regime. Also, a 
greater number of young children in hou-
sehold made individuals from Supported 
De-Familialism regime more supportive of 
government’s involvement in financing of 
childcare than the same individuals in Opti-
onal Familialism regime. We can only spe-
culate on the reasons behind these findings. 
It may be that individuals with working 
mothers who were socialized in Optional 
Familialism regime in which the childca-
re needs are widely met and where there 
is a choice between the family and formal 
care are not that sensitive to the need for 
the government’s involvement in childca-
re financing as the individuals socialized 
into the Implicit Familialism regime that is 
marked by the lack of policy support in this 
area. Also, different welfare expectations of 
families with more children in Supported 
De-Familialism and Optional Familialism 
regime may not be that surprising, as the 
affordable childcare services play an im-
portant role to larger families in Supported 
De-Familialism regime where one cannot 
choose a family care as an alternative to 
formal childcare as one can in the Optio-
nal Familialism regime. However, for more 
convincing conclusions, additional resear-
ch, which should put additional focus on 
individual socialisation experience within 
particular welfare regime, as well as on the 
structural position of different individuals 
and families within the particular welfare 
regimes, is needed. 
The findings of our additional analysis, 
focusing on the small minority choosing an 
employer as responsible for childcare fi-
nancing, rather than state or family, are also 
of interest. For these cases, the classical Es-
ping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology of 
welfare regimes served as a better predic-
tor of cross-country variations in childca-
re attitudes, with countries belonging to 
Southern and Conservative-Corporatist 
Regimes prioritizing this option. As indeed 
only a small share of individuals chose this 
option, all the conclusions here can be only 
tentative, but a possible explanation is that 
in these cases the respondents did not actu-
ally evaluate family policies related to the 
childcare financing, but the way in which 
the market should function and what sho-
uld be the role of employers, which are the 
attitudes better accounted for by Esping-
Andersen’s typology.    
16  Explicit Familialism regimes explicitly support family’s caring function through the provision of family 
benefits, and the De- Familialism regimes do it implicitly through a widespread reliance on market-driven childcare, 
which results in exacerbating class divides as only wealthier individuals can afford to pay for market-based childcare, 
while the others have to rely on informal support (see e.g. Brennan et al., 2012).
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Finally, these findings also have im-
portant implications for the welfare state 
legitimacy which is closely connected to 
individual’s position in a particular welfare 
regime and the socialization in a particular 
welfare regime may constrain (or enable) 
policy reforms aimed at increasing state 
intervention in childcare. Namely, the po-
licy feedback effects serve as an important 
“catalyst” of welfare interests, so the alre-
ady existing policies and practices may (re)
shape citizens’ interests. Hence, as already 
noticed in the literature (see Jordan, 2013), 
the existent policy and practices may pro-
duce path dependencies in policy deve-
lopment and the individuals in the countri-
es with generous and widespread childcare 
services may form strong public support 
for the increased government’s role in the 
area of childcare, and vice versa. 
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Sažetak
TKO BI TREBAO FINANCIRATI RANI PREDŠKOLSKI ODGOJ I 
OBRAZOVANJE? VIŠERAZINSKA ANALIZA 24 ZEMLJE
Ivana Dobrotić, Tanja Vučković Juroš
Studijski centar socijalnog rada
Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
Zagreb, Hrvatska
U radu se analizira kako čimbenici na individualnoj i državnoj razini utječu na stavove 
o financiranju ranog predškolskog odgoja i obrazovanja, a posebno se analizira učinak 
socijalizacije u određenom socijalnom režimu. Ovo područje istraživanja obiluje meto-
dološkim i konceptualnim pitanjima, uključujući prekomjerno oslanjanje na Esping-An-
dersenovu tipologiju režima. Stoga autori istražuju objašnjava li kategorizacija socijalnih 
režima koja je više usmjerena na obiteljsku politiku varijacije u stavovima prema predš-
kolskom odgoju i obrazovanju u različitim državama. Koristeći podatke iz ISSP za 2012. 
godinu, autori su proveli višerazinsku analizu 24 europske države i dok je učinak većine 
prediktora uglavnom u skladu s prijašnjim istraživanjima, najvažnije otkriće ove analize 
je da Leitnerova tipologija „vrsta familijalizma“ bolje objašnjava varijacije u stavovima 
o predškolskom odgoju i obrazovanju u različitim državama nego što to čini klasična Es-
ping-Andersenova tipologija. To svjedoči o važnosti programatskog pristupa u analizama 
stavova socijalne države koji povezuju javnu podršku specifičnim socijalnim programima s 
njihovim jedinstvenim značajkama.
Ključne riječi: stavovi prema ranom predškolskom odgoju i obrazovanju, ISSP, režimi 
socijalnih država, višerazinska analiza, država, obitelj.
